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Excesses of Responsibility: The Limits of Law and the Possibilities of 
Politics 
 
Kirsten Ainley* 
Published in: Ethics and International Affairs, 2011 25 (4) pp 407-431 
 
The twentieth century saw the unprecedented individualization, legalization, and 
criminalization of responsibility in international relations. At the start of the century, if 
any agent was held responsible in the international sphere for harm resulting from 
conflict or war, it was the state, and states were held politically (rather than legally, for 
the most part) responsible for their acts by other states. By the end of the century 
individuals were held legally (often criminally) responsible for such harm, now defined 
as “war crimes” or “atrocities.”1 Individuals were increasingly held responsible by 
international or hybrid tribunals set up under the auspices of the most powerful 
international institution in the post-1945 system, the UN Security Council, and with 
significant financial support from the world’s most powerful states, foremost being the 
United States. Only a few years into the twenty-first century, trials of individuals were 
under way at an independent International Criminal Court (ICC). Our first reaction when 
we see news reports of war or civil conflict is frequently to ask which individuals are 
responsible and how they are to be punished. The drive toward individual accountability 
can be seen in, for instance, the 2009 report by the Goldstone Commission into alleged 
war crimes committed in Gaza (which led to subsequent calls for the ICC to take up the 
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case), the 2011 report by the Panel of Experts set up by the UN secretary-general to 
advise on accountability in Sri Lanka, and the swift referral of the situation in Libya to 
the ICC in February 2011.2  
 
However, this shift of focus from collective-political to individual-criminal responsibility 
in international relations has not been without problems. While international criminal 
proceedings today against Radovan Karadžić, Charles Taylor, the alleged architects of 
the genocide in Cambodia, and so on seem to follow the twentieth-century trend toward 
holding individuals responsible for directly planning, commissioning, or executing 
international crimes, close examination of the trials tells a different story. The defendants 
are in fact being tried for inherently collective actions—that is, they are charged with 
being part of “joint criminal enterprises.”  In addition, there is substantial interest in using 
existing (but until now rarely utilized) international law on state responsibility to hold 
states accountable for atrocities. For example, both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia have 
sought to hold Serbia responsible for genocide at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
This signals that there are what I call “excesses of responsibility” involved in atrocity that 
legal practices of assigning individual criminal responsibility cannot capture. Attempts to 
do so via the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise, devised by the Appeals Chamber at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); the Articles of State 
Responsibility accepted by the UN General Assembly in 2001; and (though to a lesser 
extent) the long-standing doctrine of command responsibility are deeply problematic. 
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The current system of individualized, legalized responsibility is based on two principal 
assumptions, both of which I seek to challenge:  
 
1. Responsibility for war crimes is principally a characteristic of individuals. In 
order to end impunity and prevent cycles of violence, these individuals (rather 
than the states or national, ethnic, or social groups to which they belong) should 
be held responsible for such crimes. The classic statement of this position, 
followed by all subsequent international war crimes proceedings, can be found in 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg Judgment: “Crimes against 
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international 
law be enforced.”3  
2. Courts are the most appropriate institutions to adjudicate questions of 
responsibility and to hold those responsible for harm to account. Other approaches 
to atrocity (truth commissions, amnesties, and so on) are political in the worst 
sense—that is, they are tainted by partisanship and power, plus they cannot offer 
sufficiently robust protection of the innocent or punishment of the guilty. The 
rhetoric surrounding the establishment of the ICC bears out this preference for 
criminal prosecution: “In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the 
promise of universal justice. . . . Only then [when such a court is established] will 
the innocents of distant wars and conflicts know that they, too, may sleep under 
the cover of justice; that they, too, have rights, and that those who violate those 
rights will be punished.”4 With the establishment of the ICC “we are witnessing a 
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great victory for justice and for world order—a turn away from the rule of brute 
force, and towards the rule of law.”5  
 
These assumptions have been widely accepted by those seeking to bring justice to people 
who have experienced the worst types of conflict.6 Counter to this view, I argue that 
responsibility for war crimes lies not with individual perpetrators alone but also in 
significant measure with collectives and with those individuals who did not commit 
crimes but did contribute to harm. I also contend that criminal trials are limited in their 
ability to respond to atrocity, and propose a reinvigoration of notions of political 
responsibility that are enforced through such institutions as responsibility and truth 
commissions, which assign political responsibility and seek to understand the role of 
collectives, as well as a wider range of individuals, in atrocity. 
 
Justifications for war crimes trials that center on their function to ascribe individual 
responsibility (a function regarded as the bedrock of international criminal justice) lead to 
a third mistaken assumption:  
 
3. War crimes trials find individuals guilty for acts that they have directly 
perpetrated (via carrying out specific offenses or instigating, planning, or 
organizing them), in keeping with the doctrine of individual responsibility. Press 
coverage of the trial of Karadžić at the ICTY, for instance, tends to portray him as 
being tried for the direct perpetration of crimes in the former Yugoslavia, or at 
least for masterminding them. In fact, the principal charges against him are on the 
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basis of his “joint criminal enterprise” liability for actions taken by other (mostly 
collective) actors.7 Similar misunderstandings can be seen in coverage of the trials 
of Slobodan Milošević and Charles Taylor. 
 
The argument below proceeds in four parts. In the first section, I show why responsibility 
for war crimes cannot be parceled out neatly to the direct perpetrators of harm. The 
second and third sections show that when notions of collective responsibility do appear in 
judicial approaches to atrocity, they tend to do so in ways that obscure the actual 
contributions of actors to harm. The final section explains why we need to extend notions 
of responsibility beyond the law and to rejuvenate a concept of political responsibility 
more sensitive to the excesses of responsibility (both individual and collective) involved 
in atrocity. Philosophy and political theory offer a rich understanding of responsibility 
that is in danger of being lost through the increased reliance on courts to pronounce on 
issues of accountability.8 I suggest that there is a range of so-called accountability 
mechanisms, in particular forms of investigative or truth commissions, that are too often 
viewed as inferior to trials and are rarely used to hold actors to account, despite having 
great potential to do so. Using a broader range of accountability mechanisms as 
accountability mechanisms (that is, using these mechanisms primarily to hold actors to 
account and institute processes of atonement, rather than just to provide an account of 
past conflict) could substantially ameliorate the problems associated with using trials to 
process all forms of responsibility.  
 
Excesses of Responsibility 
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It is a founding principle of international criminal law (ICL) that responsibility for war 
crimes rests with individuals.9 The principle is embedded in the statutes of all the 
international and hybrid criminal tribunals (hereafter “tribunals”) and of the ICC, as well 
as in countless indictments and judgments. It is seen as particularly valuable to hold 
individuals responsible for atrocity because doing so supposedly breaks cycles of 
violence by isolating guilt to a few key perpetrators rather than entire groups. As Antonio 
Cassese, first president of the ICTY, explains:  
How can we prevent someone from instinctively hating a whole ethnic group, and 
thus leaving a spark of hatred to reignite the whole conflict if the particular member 
of that group who has allegedly wrought havoc upon him or her is not brought to 
book? Collective responsibility must be replaced by individual responsibility.10  
 
The way that domestic societies and the international community attempt to achieve this 
individualized responsibility for atrocity is increasingly through international criminal 
law, with a steady and significant rise in prosecutions for human rights crimes observed 
since 1980.11 But for all the benefits associated with a systematic international legal 
response to war crimes—which include a reduction in impunity and some (disputed) 
effects in deterring future crime—there are significant problems when courts attempt to 
adjudicate on individual responsibility for atrocities, as they struggle to parse out the 
contributions of numerous actors to crimes that are often inherently collective.12 These 
problems, and the need to focus on relatively small numbers of perpetrators for reasons of 
court capacity, have led to a reliance by international courts on notions of collective 
agency and responsibility. This should in principle have brought about more accurate 
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allocations of responsibility, due to the collective nature of atrocity crimes, but in practice 
the requirement that courts maintain the vocabulary of individual responsibility has led to 
awkward and inadequate judgments. Some individuals are held responsible for more than 
there is good evidence for (in particular when they are found liable as members of joint 
criminal enterprises) and some escape judgment entirely.  
 
Assigning responsibility for atrocity is extremely complicated given the layers of 
culpability involved. If I attack my Canadian neighbor in order to steal his car in 
peacetime, and in the process kill him, I am guilty of murder and deemed responsible for 
his death (though I may seek to mitigate my punishment by claiming diminished 
capacity, childhood abuse, and the like). But if I attack and kill my Canadian neighbor in 
order to steal his car in the context of a political program to cleanse the United States of 
Canadians, so that in part I am attacking him because he is Canadian and/or with the 
knowledge that I will probably get away with attacking him because he is Canadian, I am 
still entirely responsible for his death in a strict sense, but there are a wide range of other 
actors implicated, too: the political leaders who formulated the anti-Canadian policy; 
political functionaries who instituted the policy; groups within the community that 
fostered or allowed an atmosphere of hatred for Canadians to develop; groups or 
individuals who could have fought against these policies and the ethnic hatred they 
caused, or who could have protected my neighbor (including, where relevant, such 
organizations as the UN, international corporations, and nongovernmental organizations), 
but did nothing. Even when I appear to have acted alone to attack my neighbor, a 
significant number of other actors are involved, such that there is an excess of 
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responsibility that cannot be discharged by holding me solely responsible for murder. 
And to complicate matters further, many war crimes are committed not just by 
individuals acting in a context for which others hold responsibility but by collectives, 
such as gangs, mobs, or more formal organizations—for example, armed units. The 
appeals judgment in the first case before the ICTY describes the problem faced by 
international courts:  
Most of the time [international] crimes do not result from the criminal propensity of 
single individuals but constitute manifestations of collective criminality: the crimes 
are often carried out by groups of individuals acting in pursuance of a common 
criminal design. Although only some members of the group may physically perpetrate 
the criminal act . . . the participation and contribution of the other members of the 
group is often vital in facilitating [it]. It follows that the moral gravity of such 
participation is often no less—or indeed no different—from that of those actually 
carrying out the acts in question.13 
 
There is much to query here about whether the moral gravity of participation is lessened, 
and particularly whether it is different, when an individual acts within a group. But the 
description of why war crimes perpetration is more complicated than many other criminal 
acts is compelling. The situation gets more complicated still when we acknowledge that, 
while acts of atrocity such as rape, mutilation, and murder are usually committed by rank-
and-file members of armed groups, the people most responsible for creating, 
encouraging, and maintaining the overall contexts in which these atrocities took place are 
usually political leaders. We may want to hold the individual rapists responsible (ideally, 
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criminally liable) for their actions, but it is political leaders (Milošević, Taylor, Omar al-
Bashir, and the like) who we are most interested in prosecuting, even if they never 
physically participated in particular acts of atrocity. And while little is said about them in 
ICL, the individuals and groups who foster or allow an atmosphere of hatred to develop 
and who stand by while atrocity is perpetrated should, it is argued, also bear some 
responsibility for acts that take place in their midst. Mark Drumbl expresses this well:  
Violence becomes normalised when neighbours avert their gaze, draw the blinds, 
and excitedly move into a suddenly available apartment. This broad public 
participation, despite its catalytic role, is overlooked by criminal law, thereby 
perpetrating a myth and a deception. The myth is that a handful of people are 
responsible for endemic levels of violence. The deception . . . involves hiding the 
myriad political, economic, historical, and colonial factors that create conditions 
precedent for violence.14 
 
There are, therefore, excesses of responsibility involved in all war crimes. Even if every 
direct perpetrator was caught and prosecuted, we would not be satisfied that all 
responsibility had been correctly allocated, because the architects of the atrocity, along 
with those who had stood by and allowed the violence to happen, could have escaped 
censure. Responsibility is not a zero sum game; in most situations of atrocity, no single 
perpetrator (or even small group of perpetrators) can be considered to be completely 
responsible. Instead, atrocity is characterized by “numerous people harm[ing] others with 
differing degrees of acquiescence and direction from a large bureaucratic class.”15 
Individuals act within complex contexts to which many others contribute. The 
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foundational assumption of ICL—that responsibility for atrocity is principally a 
characteristic of individuals—is, therefore, deeply problematic.  
 
Because tribunals have found this assumption impossible to maintain, they do not hold 
individuals accountable as individuals much of the time. In fact, the majority of 
defendants before the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, and the Extraordinary Chamber of the Courts of Cambodia have 
been, or are being, tried not for rapes, murders, or acts of torture or ethnic cleansing that 
they themselves carried out, but for crimes carried out by others.16 Courts have developed 
three principal doctrines for holding individuals accountable for the acts of others or for 
collective actions, and (though much more rarely) for holding collectives accountable for 
collective or individual actions:  
 
1. Attributing criminal responsibility for the outcomes of individual actions of 
subordinates to commanders through the doctrine of “command responsibility,” 
for which the Japanese general Tomoyuki Yamashita was executed after World 
War II and under which U.S. Captain Ernest Medina was prosecuted (but 
controversially acquitted) following the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam 
War. 
 
2. Attributing criminal responsibility for the outcomes of collective actions to 
individuals (usually people who hold official positions or political power) who 
were involved in the overall scheme of which atrocities were a part, but who 
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might not have intended the outcomes in question and might not have played any 
part in the direct perpetration of the crimes. This was seen first in the charges of 
conspiracy and membership of criminal organizations at Nuremberg, and the idea 
has been developed much further through the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise. 
 
3. Attributing noncriminal responsibility for collective actions, such as genocide, to 
states, through the doctrine of state responsibility, as Bosnia-Herzegovina tried to 
do when asking the ICJ to rule on whether Serbia was responsible for genocide 
during the 1992–1995 war. 
 
Criminal Liability via Command Responsibility and Joint Criminal Enterprise 
Article 25 of the Rome Statute that established the ICC states that a person shall be 
responsible for a crime if she is involved in that crime at almost any level, regardless of 
whether other persons are responsible for the same crime. Under the statute, a person can 
be responsible for a crime committed with or through another person; a crime she 
attempted, ordered, solicited, induced, facilitated, directly and publicly incited (in respect 
of genocide); or in any other way intentionally contributed to (Article 25 (3)).  She can 
also be responsible (whether or not she is a military commander) for acts committed by 
any subordinates who were or should have been under her effective command and control 
(Article 28), or if she contributes to a crime by a group acting with a common purpose 
(Article 25).   
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Command responsibility is long established in international law. Indeed, there is 
reference to military commanders being responsible for the behavior of their subordinates 
in Sun Tzu’s Art of War from 500 BC.17 Reference to command responsibility appears in 
the 1907 Hague Conventions and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the doctrine was 
developed in important ways during the Yamashita trial at the Tokyo Tribunal in 1945. 
General Yamashita, the commanding officer of the Japanese army in the Philippines, was 
found guilty of having “unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as 
commander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to 
commit brutal atrocities.”18 The doctrine was codified into international law in the 1977 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. 
 
Jurisprudence is now settled that command responsibility applies not just to military 
commanders but also to political leaders and other civilian superiors in positions of de 
jure authority or de facto control over the direct perpetrator.19 This is a less controversial 
doctrine than joint criminal enterprise, as criminal liability requires both knowledge (in 
most circumstances) and culpable inaction on behalf of the commander: the commander 
must have known, or had reason to know, that the crime was about to be or had been 
committed, and must have failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 
the crime(s) or to punish the perpetrator(s).20 Despite controversy over the expansive 
position tribunals have taken regarding what it means for commanders “to know or have 
reason to know” that their subordinates were about to or had committed a crime, and 
despite some misgivings about the appropriateness of ICL as a vehicle for holding 
negligent superiors to account (because to do so stigmatizes the commander in the same 
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way as the perpetrator), the doctrine of command responsibility is a broadly accepted 
means of allocating some of the excess of responsibility involved in atrocity.21  
 
It is worth noting explicitly, however, how awkwardly this doctrine fits with the idea of 
individual criminal responsibility. No intent is required for command responsibility to be 
proven, and no direct evidence need link the alleged perpetrator to the crime. Instead, 
command responsibility “allows conviction and punishment based [not on the gathering 
of direct evidence but] on a philosophical construct” that assumes that “certain roles 
come with built-in accountability for the actions of others, whether or not the individual 
who holds the role was aware of these actions.”22  In addition, international prosecutors 
have found it hard to establish that those accused of bearing command responsibility for 
the actions of others actually did play the role assumed—that is, that they had the 
requisite control over their subordinates. This has left commentators concerned that 
prosecuting under the doctrine is too difficult, with Mark Osiel noting that as of 2008 
only one person had been convicted by the ICTY solely on the basis of command 
responsibility.23 
 
The other doctrine devised by tribunals to make individuals criminally liable for the acts 
of others, joint criminal enterprise (JCE), is the subject of greater contestation. JCE is the 
mode of liability alleged in cases where a command hierarchy cannot be established, but 
there is nevertheless a desire to hold responsible as direct perpetrators certain individuals 
who did not carry out, aid, and abet, or otherwise directly perpetrate the atrocity in 
question. Charges of conspiracy and membership of criminal organizations were 
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available to the Nuremberg Tribunal to enable convictions of leaders who were not 
implicated in crimes, but the tribunal did not rely upon them. Defendants at Nuremberg 
were “found guilty on the basis of their willful and purposive criminal conduct” rather 
than imputed liability, with their own actions establishing their culpability beyond 
doubt.24 Such an approach was rejected by the 1990s tribunals, leading to the 
development of the doctrine of JCE.  
 
Under JCE, a defendant is found guilty of crimes committed by others as if they had 
themselves committed the crime, despite the fact that they may not have participated in, 
or even known about, the crime in question. The doctrine was invented during the Duško 
Tadić case, the first case heard by the ICTY. The Trial Chamber at the ICTY originally 
acquitted Tadić of a crime against humanity for the killing of five men in 
the Bosnian village of Jaskici, because although Tadić had been at the scene of the crime, 
there was no evidence that he had taken part in the murders. The Appeals Chamber 
overturned this judgment on the basis that Tadić had gone to Jaskici, along with the 
eventual murderers, with the intention of ethnically cleansing the village. Murder, the 
Appeals Chamber judged, was a “natural and foreseeable” consequence of effecting the 
common criminal plan for which Tadić and his men had traveled to Jaskici.25 The court 
justified its decision to convict Tadić with the following statement:  
All those who have engaged in serious violations of international humanitarian law, 
whatever the manner in which they may have perpetrated, or participated . . . must be 
brought to justice. If this is so, it is fair to conclude that the Statute [of the ICTY] does 
not confine itself to providing for jurisdiction over those persons who plan, instigate, 
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order, physically perpetrate a crime or otherwise aid and abet in its planning, 
preparation or execution. The Statute . . . does not exclude those modes of 
participating in the commission of crimes which occur where several persons having a 
common purpose embark on criminal activity that is then carried out either jointly or 
by some members of this plurality of persons. Whoever contributes to the commission 
of crimes by the group of persons or some members of the group, in execution of a 
common criminal purpose, may be held to be criminally liable.26 
 
Various aspects of this statement deserve careful scrutiny: employing the ideological 
weight of the concept of atrocity to justify extending the statute substantially beyond its 
original wording; the assumption that anything not expressly excluded by the statute is 
therefore included; and the ascription of criminal liability rather than just responsibility. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the most important aspect of the judgment is the 
justification used for the development of JCE. The judgment states that the ICTY has 
jurisdiction over those persons directly connected to a crime, but also for everyone in a 
group that can be deemed to have a common criminal purpose. I argue below that JCE is 
less a necessary corrective to the doctrine of individual responsibility and more a catchall 
concept, which contradicts the normal requirements of criminal law that defendants have 
committed a crime (actus reus) with intention or at least knowledge of that crime (mens 
rea).  Rather than making prosecution too hard, as the doctrine of command 
responsibility might be argued to do, JCE makes prosecution too easy. As one observer 
has pointed out, JCE seems to allow courts to “just convict everyone.”27  
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There are three types of JCE: JCE I (Basic JCE), in which all participants in the common 
design possess the same intent to commit a crime and one or more of them actually 
perpetrates the crime; JCE II (Systemic JCE), in which the requisite mens rea comprises 
knowledge of the nature of a criminal system and intent to further the common design of 
ill-treatment; and JCE III (Extended JCE), which involves holding someone responsible 
as a principal (rather than an accessory) for crimes committed by other members of a 
group of which they were part. All the prosecution needs to show to establish liability 
under JCE III is: (a) the intention to take part in a JCE and to further the criminal 
purposes of that enterprise (for instance, the forcible expulsion of civilians from occupied 
territory); and (b) that the crimes committed by other members of the group (which were 
not the object of the JCE but were additional to it) were natural and foreseeable 
consequences (though not necessarily foreseen consequences) of the JCE.28  
 
JCE I deals effectively with small-scale group or mob violence carried out over a short 
time period in which all participants share the same intent (for instance, to gain 
information by torturing a group of civilians or to loot a town) and all contribute to 
carrying out the criminal plan. JCE II is for the most part a reliable way to hold 
responsible the commanders and functionaries who organize and run concentration 
camps—those who know of serious abuses and willingly participate in the functioning of 
the institution, but who may not themselves kill or abuse those imprisoned in the camps. 
In both cases, those convicted via JCE can be reasonably said to have known about, and 
often directly intended, the crimes in question, as well as taken some bureaucratic part in 
their perpetration.  
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However, it is JCE III that has been a “magic bullet” for prosecutors at the tribunals, as 
no evidence is required of the direct participation of the accused in any single crime.29 
Also, the group involved in the JCE III need not be organized in a military, political, or 
administrative structure; the common plan for commission of a crime under the statute 
does not need to have been previously formulated—it can “materialize 
extemporaneously”; and the accused does not need to have participated in furthering the 
criminal purpose of the group—she just needs to have intended to do so.30 The common 
purpose of such groups has been expanded in recent trials to striking proportions. For 
instance, Radovan Karadžić has been indicted at the ICTY on the basis of his 
participation, from October 1991 until November 30, 1995, in a JCE that had as its 
objective the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian 
Serb–claimed territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina through such crimes as genocide, 
persecution, extermination, murder, deportation, and inhumane acts (forcible transfer). 
The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has charged that Karadžić either shared the intent for 
the commission of the crimes with other members of the JCE or shared an objective, 
including at least the crimes of deportation and inhumane acts, but should be held 
responsible on the basis that it was foreseeable that the other crimes listed might be 
perpetrated by one or more members of the JCE. The (thousands of) members of the JCE 
are listed as eleven named individuals, plus: members of the Bosnian Serb leadership; 
members of the Bosnian Serb Democratic Party and Bosnian Serb government bodies at 
the republic, regional, municipal, and local levels, including Crisis Staffs, War 
Presidencies, and War Commissions; commanders, assistant commanders, senior officers, 
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and chiefs of units of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Yugoslav People’s 
Army, the Yugoslav Army, the army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Bosnian Serb Territorial Defense at the 
republic, regional, municipal, and local level; and leaders of Serbian and Bosnian Serb 
paramilitary forces and volunteer units.31  
 
To find Karadžić criminally liable equivalent to a principal perpetrator for all foreseeable 
crimes—including genocide—committed over a four-year period by the actors listed 
above seems off the mark insofar as it would not identify his actual contribution to these 
crimes, assuming there is one. Indeed, such indictments only fuel arguments that the 
ICTY is anti-Serbian, working to reinvigorate partisan support for the likes of Karadžić 
and Milošević.32 Overall, the doctrine of JCE has been expanded so far beyond the 
normal requirements of criminal liability (mens rea, actus reus, and the principle of 
nullem crimen sine lege, which forbids courts from finding defendants guilty of acts that 
were not crimes at the time they were committed) that it is almost unrecognizable as law. 
As such, it is liable to misapplication due to the complexity of the jurisprudence, as in the 
case of Augustine Gbao at the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Gbao was convicted, in the 
words of a dissenting judge, of crimes that “he did not intend, to which he did not 
significantly contribute, and which were not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
crimes he did intend.”33 The Rome Statue seeks to rein in the jurisprudence of the 
tribunals, but its provisions for “co-perpetration” are yet to be concretized in trial 
decisions and could potentially be almost as expansive of those of JCE.34 The reality of 
collective criminality sits uneasily alongside the doctrine of individual responsibility, 
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which sees responsibility not as shared but as residing within multiple separate 
individuals. 
 
Legal Accountability via State Responsibility  
 
The doctrines of command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise each administer 
excesses of responsibility by assigning multiple legal responsibilities for the same crime, 
but only, and with difficulty, to individual perpetrators. While the predominant 
assumption in the contemporary system is that responsibility is a property of individuals, 
there is also a route within international law to hold collectives, in the form of states, 
legally responsible (but not criminally liable) as collectives. Traditionally, there have 
been few ways in which states could be held responsible by actors other than their own 
populations. This has changed recently both with the development of the responsibility to 
protect doctrine (which does not yet have a secure international legal status) and with the 
completion of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (hereinafter the “Articles”). The Articles were adopted by the International Law 
Commission and commended to governments by the General Assembly in 2001, three 
years after the Rome Statute—establishing an ICC founded on individual responsibility—
was agreed.35  
 
The Articles codify the conditions under which states can be held responsible for 
“internationally wrongful acts” (IWAs) by external agents, such as the International 
Court of Justice. An IWA can be a breach of treaty-based bilateral or multilateral 
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obligations, or a serious breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of 
general international law (that is, a norm that is “accepted and recognized by the 
international community . . . as a norm from which no derogation is permitted”).36 If 
found responsible for an IWA, the responsible state is under an obligation to make full 
reparation for the injury caused, which could include restitution (reestablishing the 
situation that existed before the wrongful act), compensation (for the damage caused by 
the act, including any financially assessable damage), and satisfaction (which may consist 
in an acknowledgment of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology, or 
another appropriate modality). Missing from the Articles is a conception of state 
criminality, as the International Law Commission tried but failed, in the face of 
significant pressure from states, to establish that states could have criminal intent.   
 
This notion of state accountability sits awkwardly alongside the doctrine of individual 
responsibility, to say the least. Gerry Simpson argues that the Articles bear significant 
resemblance to the Versailles settlement of World War I, which the doctrine of individual 
responsibility was supposed to supersede.37 There are provisions in the Articles to avoid 
states from being crippled by reparations, but nevertheless the impulses behind both the 
Articles and the Treaty of Versailles remain the same: to hold states responsible, as states, 
in a meaningful way. Given that the docket of the ICJ is busier than ever, there is reason 
to think that the doctrine of state responsibility will increase in salience in the future. But 
while it is undoubtedly progressive that the Articles recognize that agents other than 
individuals may bear responsibility for atrocity, their early application suggests they may 
not solve the problems of excess responsibility as described above. 
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Similar to joint criminal enterprise, the implications of state responsibility are mixed, and 
the effects of the Articles have been weak, as illustrated by the first case in which the ICJ 
applied the Articles in their final form. In 2007 the ICJ found Serbia guilty of failing to 
prevent the genocide of 8,000 Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995 and failing to 
punish the alleged perpetrators or surrender them to the ICTY.38 The judgment marked 
the first time that the court had ruled on state responsibility for genocide and, despite the 
scope offered by the Articles, the court issued a relatively irresolute ruling. Bosnia 
alleged that Serbia’s support for the ethnic cleansing of Muslims from Bosnian territory 
amounted to genocide. The court ruled (13–2) that Serbia had not committed genocide 
but found (12–3) that Serbia had violated the obligation to prevent genocide, as derived 
from the Genocide Convention, insofar as it had continued to support the Bosnian Serb 
military and political leadership despite being aware that genocide could result from its 
actions. Much of the court’s decision making turned on the issue of intention, in 
particular the extent to which the “special intent” required for genocide could be 
observed in the actions of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. It concluded that most of the 
crimes committed during the 1992–1995 war were “acts of genocide,” but not genocide 
per se, as it had not been proven that those planning and carrying out the acts (Srebrenica 
apart) had intended to destroy Bosnian Muslims as a group. Even where special intent 
was found in connection with Srebrenica, the ICJ ruled that Serbia was not responsible 
for genocide as, it was argued, while Belgrade had provided assistance and support to the 
direct perpetrators, those perpetrators were not under the “effective control” of Belgrade, 
nor was it proven that the aid and assistance offered by Belgrade to Republika Srpska 
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came at a time when Serbian authorities were clearly aware that genocide was about to 
take place or was under way.39  
 
These rulings proved highly controversial, offering, according to some observers, a 
“posthumous acquittal” to Slobodan Milošević on charges of genocide.40 More broadly, 
they offered tacit support to moves to shield the Serbian state from responsibility and to 
see a limited number of individuals blamed for past war crimes, and did little to challenge 
the ideologies that underpinned Serbian policies in the 1990s.41 Rather than providing a 
valuable supplement to the doctrine of individual responsibility, they seemed to yield to 
it. They also offered little tangible justice to Bosnians. Bosnia had requested substantial 
reparations from Serbia, but the court decided that financial compensation for the failure 
to prevent genocide was not justified, and deemed the most appropriate form of 
satisfaction to be a declaration that Serbia had failed to comply with the obligation to 
prevent genocide. Boris Tadić, the president of Serbia, acknowledged the ruling of the 
court, and the Serbian Parliament passed a resolution in March 2010 condemning the 
Srebrenica massacre. However, the resolution did not acknowledge the massacre as 
genocide, did not admit Serbian complicity in it, and did not represent a significant 
majority view. The resolution passed by just two votes.  
 
Although the ICJ ruling forced some level of accountability in Serbia, the response of, 
and to, the court was far inferior to the scale of the crimes. The court’s narrow ruling was 
not altogether surprising, given how reluctant the ICJ has been in the past to venture into 
the territory of politics or to render decisions that are likely to cause controversy, and 
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there is little sign that this will change.42 While more cases concerning state 
responsibility might be heard at the ICJ, the Articles are unlikely to be used by the court 
to build a robust regime of collective accountability. More generally, it is unclear how 
holding collective actors legally responsible can sit coherently alongside the 
individualized responsibility sought in international criminal law. In February 2006 
courts in the Hague were simultaneously hearing cases in which Slobodan Milošević was 
being held individually responsible (as part of a JCE) for genocide in the former 
Yugoslavia, while Serbia was being held responsible as a state for the same crime.43 
Since then, Bosnian Serbs Ljubisa Beara and Vujadin Popovic have been found guilty of 
the genocide at Srebrenica (by way of JCE, though acting under the orders of Karadžić), 
and Karadžić is on trial for the same crime (via a JCE in which neither Beara nor Popovic 
are named).  
 
From Legal to Political Responsibility 
 
The argument in the previous sections has questioned common assumptions about 
international criminal law and outlined how, despite its being founded on the principle of 
individual responsibility, most criminal cases at the international level hold individuals 
legally responsible for collective criminality. However, most individuals and collectives 
who contribute to atrocity (those who stoke hatred, the bystanders, the collaborators, and 
so on) are outside the jurisdiction of courts. And when collectives are held legally 
responsible as collectives (for instance, at the ICJ), the results, so far at least, are 
underwhelming. In short, using courts as the sole vehicles by which to hold actors to 
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account leads both to confused principles and confused practices, which in turn leave 
excesses of responsibility unallocated.  
 
The confusions arise, I contend, because of a second form of excess: an excess use of 
law, in particular courts and trials, as the means by which to adjudicate questions of 
responsibility.44 There is little doubt that trials have some positive effects. Hunjoon Kim 
and Kathryn Sikkink, for example, find that “human rights prosecutions (including 
international criminal trials) have a strong and statistically significant impact on 
decreasing the level of repression.”45 Trials for atrocity crimes are also argued to have 
important retributive and expressive functions.46 Certainly, accountability of some kind is 
to be preferred to impunity of any kind. But the juridification of conflict and the focus of 
courts on a few prominent individuals both elides how those individuals were responsible 
for collective crimes and also threatens our ability to make sophisticated judgments about 
collaborators or bystanders. Those actors whose behavior is not easily characterized as 
innocent or criminally guilty, yet who are central to atrocity—that is, those who (alone or 
collectively) enabled or failed to prevent atrocity—are rarely prosecuted. These actors 
should be held to account alongside planners, instigators, and perpetrators both for 
reasons of justice and also to deter future violence:  
If average citizens believed they might be much worse off if they followed the 
exhortations of conflict entrepreneurs, then fewer would follow, and some might 
even discredit these entrepreneurs early enough in the game to preclude them 
from gaining momentum . . . [yet] since passive acquiescence rarely—if ever—is 
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implicated in a system based exclusively on individualized criminal justice, it is 
unclear how this system can deter this fundamental prerequisite to mass atrocity.47  
 
International criminal and public law have important roles to play in bringing offenders 
to justice, but the trend toward charging individuals with participation in large-scale JCEs 
cannot compensate for the inability of courts to fully allocate responsibility for atrocity.48 
Furthermore, courts are not the optimal forums in which to determine the institutional and 
societal reforms required to prevent similar violence in the future. In order to hold to 
account a greater number of actors in the most appropriate ways, and thereby reduce 
excesses of responsibility, a broader conception of responsibility is required, one that 
reaches beyond criminal or legal responsibility and is able to process collective alongside 
individual accountability.  
 
Perhaps the best-known advocate of distinguishing between criminal guilt and other 
forms of responsibility, and in particular elucidating a concept of political responsibility, 
is Karl Jaspers. After World War II, Jaspers called on Germans to recognize their 
responsibility in four ways: criminal guilt (guilt adjudicated through criminal law); 
political guilt (which requires the guilty to “bear the consequences of the deeds of the 
state whose power governs me and under whose order I live,” but does not involve 
individual blame or liability); moral guilt (guilt for the things I have done); and 
metaphysical guilt (which comes about because “there exists a solidarity among men as 
human beings that makes each co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the 
world, especially for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge”).49 Iris 
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Marion Young draws similar distinctions based on the work of Hannah Arendt: “(1) those 
guilty of crimes; (2) those not guilty, but who bear responsibility because they 
participated in the society and provided the guilty agents with at least passive support that 
undergirds their power; (3) those who took action to distance themselves from the 
wrongs, either by forms of withdrawal or efforts at preventing some of them; (4) those 
who publicly opposed or resisted the wrongful actions.”50 Young notes that the second 
and fourth of these definitions concern political responsibility (with the first and third 
describing legal and moral responsibility). She adds to Arendt’s (and, implicitly, 
Jaspers’s) conception a requirement that those who bear political responsibility, like those 
who bear guilt, do so because of actions they have or have not taken, alone or as 
members of groups, rather than because of their nationality or ethnicity.  
  
Jaspers, Arendt, and Young recognized the need for a notion of political responsibility 
that is separate from and complementary to legal responsibility. The notion of political 
responsibility is particularly important here because the destruction of the polis is a 
known contributing factor to mass violence: “the deformations visited on the body 
politic, the low-level humiliations endured by those marked as different, the cruelties of a 
monstrous economic order and the sometimes subtle violations visited on language” 
create the conditions of possibility for atrocity.51 But what form of institution could 
determine such responsibility? There already exists in the field of transitional justice an 
array of accountability mechanisms, all of which have the potential to supplement courts 
in establishing the political responsibility of individuals and groups for past violence. 
However, these mechanisms are too often used to account for the past or to provide an 
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account, rather than to hold to account. This can be seen in the practices of, and discourse 
around, the most prominent accountability mechanism beside courts: nonjudicial 
commissions of enquiry, such as truth commissions.  
 
The International Center for Transitional Justice states that “some 40 official truth 
commissions have been created to provide an account of past abuses”52 (italics added). 
Yet keeping a record of the past has not been the only rationale for establishing such 
commissions: the pioneering National Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP) was 
set up in Argentina in 1983 to work alongside courts in achieving accountability, and the 
early Latin American truth commissions did have goals that included establishing 
accountability.53 Since then, truth commissions have increasingly become decoupled 
from prosecution processes, and their role in adjudicating accountability has become 
minimal.54 Amnesty International does not even mention accountability when setting out 
the goals of truth commissions: “truth commissions should 1) clarify as far as possible the 
facts about past human rights violations; 2) provide the evidence they gather to 
continuing and new investigations and criminal judicial proceedings; 3) formulate 
effective recommendations for providing full reparations to all the victims and their 
families.”55 Similar arguments can be made for other nonjudicial mechanisms; for 
instance, the terms of reference for the UK Chilcot Inquiry over the Iraq conflict are: “to 
establish, as accurately as possible, what happened and to identify the lessons that can be 
learned” rather than to establish accountability.56  
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It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that many observers and practitioners exhibit a 
“prosecution preference,” with nonjudicial mechanisms seen as second-best. As Miriam 
Aukerman has argued: “While participants in [debates about transitional justice] disagree 
as to when trials are possible in practice, they generally share a basic assumption: 
prosecuting perpetrators of injustice is the optimal method for dealing with past 
atrocities.”57 Yet if accountability is to be extended beyond those who are criminally 
guilty, or if accountability is to be sought at all in situations where criminal trials are for 
some reason not possible, other mechanisms are needed to adjudicate it. The most 
promising route is an enhanced form of truth commissions, labeled here responsibility 
and truth commissions (RTCs). Recent research bears this out: hybrid systems (that is, 
combinations of trials, amnesties, and commissions) have been shown to be more 
effective than any single mechanism in deterring human rights abuses, and truth 
commissions are judged to be most successful when they have the resources and support 
needed to establish accountability as well as truth (for instance, powers of subpoena and 
search and seizure, and to name perpetrators and make mandatory recommendations).58 
Such commissions should have the authority to hold to account not just individuals but 
groups: political, military, media, and private sector actors, international organizations, 
and any others who could be said to bear some significant responsibility for the enabling 
conditions of atrocity. Attempts have been made in past commissions to consider the 
responsibility of groups, but the focus tends to fall back onto individuals—with 
unfortunate results. Susie Linfield notes that, despite plans for the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission to investigate institutional responsibility for apartheid:  
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By focusing on human-rights violations . . . the [Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission] neglected the more banal evils that sustained apartheid—the myriad 
ways in which everyday life itself was an insult to, indeed a negation of, human 
rights and human dignity. The hearings may, paradoxically, have thus enabled a 
majority of whites—who, after all, were not criminals or sadists themselves, 
merely beneficiaries of a criminal, sadistic system—to wall themselves off from 
responsibility.59 
 
RTCs should, therefore, resist the trend toward individualizing responsibility in favor of 
assessing accountability across diverse actors—something courts are unable to do. RTCs 
would adjudicate accountability in ways different from and complementary to courts, in 
particular by offering opportunities for reflection, atonement, and the repair of the polis. 
Young sees the outcome of political responsibility as consisting in “watching [our social] 
institutions, monitoring their effects to make sure they are not grossly harmful, and 
maintaining organized public space where such watching and monitoring can occur and 
citizens can speak publicly and support one another in their efforts to prevent 
suffering.”60 These are goals appropriate to commissions, but not to courts. 
Responsibility in RTCs would not be established beyond reasonable doubt (though it 
would be investigated thoroughly), nor would it be punished through imprisonment. 
Accountability would be achieved through the naming of offenders (under carefully 
defined conditions) to generate condemnation of their acts, and such measures 
(recommended by the commission for implementation by political bodies) as the removal 
of certain persons from office, the restructuring or destruction of public or private 
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institutions that facilitated atrocity, sanctions, reparations programs, and acts of 
atonement.61 Atonement, or the restoration of the moral worth of the individual or group 
via “a willed, purposive effort to travel the distance between the wrong committed and 
the parties, both perpetrator and victim, who have been affected, morally diminished, by 
it,” is not achieved through trials, which individualize guilt in the few and exonerate the 
many.62 Rather, it is achieved through public processes in which those who did not 
defend the polis must work to rebuild it, while those who stood by and watched atrocity, 
and those who privately opposed aggressive regimes but did not publically act, must 
reckon with themselves. Such processes of atonement as reparation, apology, 
memorialization and the transformation of legal and political systems, are rarely, if ever, 
mandated by courts, but they are appropriate as responses to actors who bear political 
accountability.  
 
RTCs would not “solve” problems of responsibility on their own. Indeed, it should be 
recognized each time that accountability mechanisms are sought that no mechanism or 
combination of measures will ever put right the wrongs done through violence. RTCs 
would face the same challenges as truth commissions, often amplified because of their 
enhanced powers and mandates. Enforcement of RTC findings would be challenging in 
the face of recalcitrant regimes, political pressure may lead to some individuals and 
groups escaping censure, and many actors are likely to try and evade responsibility. The 
enforcement record of truth commissions is generally poor, and the willingness of 
international institutions to push national authorities toward implementation of 
commission findings seems to have weakened, despite the fact that such external pressure 
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seems to help commissions to focus on accountability as well as truth.63 Compromises 
may have to be made between goals of accountability and of stability, and RTCs will 
have to make pragmatic as well as principled decisions about aspects of their functioning: 
whether to grant amnesty from criminal prosecution in return for testimony, how hard to 
press states and other powerful actors for information, whether to publish 
recommendations that could be incendiary, and so on.  
 
Perhaps the most critical (and difficult) issue to be resolved is how RTCs could work 
alongside trials to provide a complementary system of accountability without either 
threatening the work of the other. There are important examples of truth commissions 
that have complemented judicial mechanisms: in Argentina and Chad, facts established 
by truth commissions were later used to build prosecutions, and the truth commission in 
Guatemala spurred efforts toward trials.64 There is a need, however, for more work on the 
conditions under which the two can be most effective. The strong powers of subpoena 
and search and seizure that commissions would need may clash with courts’ powers if 
investigating the same situations, and courts will likely want access to any self-
incriminating or confidential evidence that commissions might hold. Research findings 
on the likely effects of the ICC on truth commissions are inconclusive at present, though 
significant steps have been made toward identifying frameworks for coordination (around 
confidential information sharing, conditional amnesties, and mitigation of sentence for 
participating in commissions) that could further the goals of each institution.65  
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Despite these issues, RTCs would be an important (re)-addition to the contemporary 
architecture of accountability. The starting assumptions of the current system, that 
responsibility for atrocity is individual and can, for the most part, be captured under 
criminal law, have led to collective responsibility being assigned in ad hoc and often 
confused ways. They have also led to notions of political responsibility being sidelined in 
favor of legal responsibility. Recognizing that responsibility for atrocity is fundamentally 
collective as well as individual, and political as well as legal, necessitates innovative 
institutional responses. Tasking bodies other than courts to determine some significant 
aspects of the responsibility for war crimes would reduce excesses of responsibility, and 
lessen the reliance by courts on such doctrines as joint criminal enterprise to sanction 
those actors who are implicated politically but not, perhaps, criminally in atrocity.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The legalization and individualization of responsibility have brought some real benefits; 
they have challenged sovereign immunity and engendered a debate about what it is 
acceptable for states and statespeople to do to their citizens. But the current regime is 
inherently conflicted due to the excesses of responsibility involved in atrocity. 
International criminal law cannot take adequate account of these excesses, as its purpose 
is to find individual guilt for inherently collective crimes. And when it appears that law 
can take account of excess—for instance, through such doctrines as joint criminal 
enterprise—it seems to do so only via compromising its fundamental principles. At the 
same time, an excessive reliance on law downplays the political dimensions of atrocity 
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and the culpability of a wide range of individual and collective actors in allowing 
political space to be closed down and oppression to begin.  
 
In response to the inherent limits of law, I have suggested a rejuvenation of the idea of 
political responsibility, and a new approach to the kind of investigative or truth 
commissions that are often described as accountability mechanisms but rarely seem to 
function as such. I have argued that we should support not just trials as responses to 
atrocity but also mandate such mechanisms as responsibility and truth commissions to 
establish political responsibility. In doing so, they would require large numbers of 
culpable (but not necessarily legally guilty) actors to take responsibility for their actions 
and inactions, atone for harm they have contributed to, and rebuild their political space. 
Such a system would generate its own problems, and some excesses would undoubtedly 
remain. Nevertheless, using RTCs alongside trials would be superior to using 
international law alone to allocate responsibility as—through recognizing both individual 
and collective actors and both legal and political responsibility—these commissions 
would reduce excesses of responsibility and move societies closer to achieving justice 
after violence. 
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